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Abstract 
 
This article explores the pressures operating on European Union Foreign and Security Policy 
in the ‘triangle of forces’ created by the European integration process, developments in the 
Islamic world and the responses of the United States. In the first section, the article explores 
ideas about foreign policy and power in the EU, as exemplified in debates about the Lisbon 
Treaty and the future role of the Union. The second part of the paper sets out three logics 
inherent in the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, distinguishing 
between the ‘internal’ logic of the European integration process, the ‘external’ logic reflecting 
the opportunity structure in the world arena, which creates challenges and opportunities for 
the EU and its Member States, and the ‘identity’ logic, which creates a move towards self-
realisation and ‘self-recognition’ on the part of the EU in international politics, and relates this 
to recent developments in European foreign and security policy. The article then argues that 
the multi-dimensional ‘triangle of forces’ between European integration, the Islamic world and 
the United States has played a key role in focusing these developments, by posing 
challenges to the three logics and creating complex linkages between them. The Conclusion 
asks whether as a result EU foreign policy has been ‘catalysed’ (given new impetus and 
direction) or ‘constrained’ (subject to a process of external or self-limitation).  
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Introduction 
The development of European foreign policy, understood here as the 
collective external action of European Community (EC) and then European 
Union (EU) Member States has been a key feature of the European 
integration project since the late 1960s (Allen and Wallace 1977; Forster 
2004; Forster and Wallace 1996, 2000; Nuttall 1992, 2000; Peterson and 
Sjursen 1998; Wallace 2005). The first stage of this development entailed the 
elaboration of the essentially intergovernmental structures of European 
Political Cooperation, which were formalised in the London Report of 1981 
and then in the Single European Act of 1985. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 
then proclaimed the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), which was further consolidated in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and 
the Nice Treaty of 2000. During the late 1990s, moves were initiated to go 
beyond the CFSP and create what has since become the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Howorth 2005, 2007). As a result, not only has 
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the European Union developed a system of continuous diplomatic 
coordination through the CFSP, it has also begun to create the capacity to 
deploy military power, albeit in a restricted range of contexts and with a 
restricted set of purposes. Arguably, this process has made the EU into a 
diplomatic and even military ‘power’ to range alongside the leading states 
within the world arena (Hill and Smith 2005: Introduction and Conclusion); but 
as the treatment of foreign policy issues in the Constitutional Treaty 
negotiations and the build-up to the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 showed, there is 
still a great deal of contestation around this issue arising out of the divergent 
preferences of leading EU Member States. 
 One key feature of the long and often contested evolution of European 
foreign policy is its close relationship to the development of key issues within 
the world arena. Most obviously, the end of the Cold War created a new 
impetus towards foreign policy cooperation among EU Member States, both 
for defensive reasons and for more positive reasons connected with the 
promotion of a ‘European model’ in diplomacy and conflict management. In a 
longer-term perspective, the links between the evolution of European foreign 
policy and the problematic nature of American leadership within the ‘Western 
Alliance’ have been well-documented (Allen and Smith 1989; McGuire and 
Smith 2008; Peterson 1996; Peterson and Pollack 2003; Smith 2005). 
 In the context of this article, though, it is of the greatest importance that 
European foreign policy has frequently been catalysed or constrained by the 
development of relations between the United States, Europe and the Islamic 
world. Initially, the key focus of this entanglement was the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, especially in the context of the October War, the 1970s oil crises and 
the increasing attention to the issue of the Palestinians (Allen and Pijpers 
1982). The 1980s Venice Declaration of the European Community was a first 
significant sign that the collective diplomatic position of the Europeans might 
diverge from that of the Americans and Israel; the rights of the Palestinians 
and the centrality of the issue of Palestinian statehood have remained key to 
European collective positions ever since. Since the end of the Cold War, the 
EU has played an active role in the ‘greater Middle East’ both diplomatically 
through the CFSP and more broadly in the provision of support for peace-
building processes, and have become an established member of the ‘quartet’ 
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attempting to sponsor a long-term peace framework (Ortega 2003; Youngs 
2006). But there are paradoxical elements to the EU’s involvement: for 
example, although the Union is heavily involved with support for the 
Palestinian Authority, and has a significant economic relationship with Israel 
extending to a customs union, it appears to have very little leverage on events 
(O’Donnell 2008). 
 Although the Israel-Palestine issue remains at the core of EU 
diplomacy, there has grown up during the past decade a much broader and 
more challenging engagement with the putative ‘clash of civilisations’ between 
the West and the Islamic world, which has a particular resonance for the EU 
given its proximity to several arenas of conflict and the historical entanglement 
of many EU Member States with Muslim cultures and populations. The 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, and especially those over 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, were and remain challenging for the EU; 
the crystallising events of September 11th 2001 and the subsequent ‘war on 
terror’ have multiplied the challenge and given it new dimensions linked with 
broader global insecurities; and the continuing tensions surrounding 
enlargement of the EU to encompass Turkey have confronted EU institutions 
and Member States with further inescapable pressures (Youngs 2006). 
 How well has European foreign policy served the EU in responding to 
these challenges? And how might the challenges be dealt with in the future? 
In order to understand at least some of the answers to these questions, this 
article examines in detail the forces lying behind recent developments in 
European foreign policy, and relates those forces to the challenges and 
opportunities arising from developments in the ‘triangle of forces’ constituted 
by Europe, the United States and the Islamic world. First, it presents a short 
review of the notion of the EU as a ‘power’, with attention to the relationship 
between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power, and relates this to the perspectives of policy-
makers. Second, it sets out the three key logics that seem to drive the 
development of European foreign policy, and explores some key trends 
emerging from those logics. Finally, it relates the earlier argument directly to 
the ways in which the EU finds itself as part of the ‘triangle of forces’ 
composed of itself, the US and the Islamic world, and takes up a number of 
the central themes in this Special Issue. The article concludes by suggesting 
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some potential futures for the relationships, linking them to the potential future 
of European foreign policy. 
 
Foreign Policy, Power and the European Model 
There is well established interest in the ways in which the European Union 
(EU) has become a ‘power’ in international politics, and to exploration of the 
implications of this status (Hill and Smith 2005: Introduction and Conclusion; 
Sjursen 2007; Aggestam 2008). A key strand of discussion has been the 
analysis of the relationship between ‘soft’ or ‘civilian’ power (often also linked 
with arguments about ‘normative power’ or ‘ethical’ power’) and ‘hard power’, 
linked with the development of a ‘real’ foreign policy for the EU (Manners 
2006; K. Smith 2005; M. Smith 2006b). Often, the analysis has been extended 
into consideration of issues such as roles and identity, on the assumption that 
these issues can be explored in order to provide a deeper understanding of 
the dynamics of European foreign policy formation, and of the ways European 
foreign policy works when projected into the external world (Elgström and 
Smith 2006; Aggestam 2004). European foreign policy is thus in some ways a 
test-bed for the exploration of key theoretical issues about foreign policy in a 
post-sovereign and post-Cold War world (Sjursen 2003; M. Smith 2003; White 
2001). In particular, the EU’s move along the spectrum between ‘soft’ power 
and ‘hard’ power, and the implications for legitimacy and accountability in 
European foreign policy, have formed a key conceptual focus. 
 ‘European foreign policy’, though, is not simply a field for the study of 
abstractions and for intellectual sport. It is one of the key arenas for political 
contestation in setting the agenda for the future development of the EU itself. 
For evidence, one need look no further than recent reflections by policy 
makers in a range of EU Member States. The debates surrounding both the 
negotiations on the failed Constitutional Treaty and the subsequent Lisbon 
Treaty and the development of a longer term perspective on the EU’s role in 
the world have centred on a number of key themes: the need to maintain 
European prosperity and security, the potential of the EU as a model of 
regional cooperation, and the need in this cause to deploy both ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ power in the promotion of democracy and the treatment of conflict in the 
wider world (Gnesotto and Grevi 2006).  In the words of the British Foreign 
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Secretary, David Miliband, this did not mean that the EU could or should 
become a Superpower, in the sense of a potential global hegemon; rather, it 
should (must?) become a ‘model power’ providing a role model and using its 
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power to promote a civilised world (Miliband 2007). In doing 
this, it shared both values and aims with the USA: ‘…there is a great shared 
project for Europe and America, to embed our values and commitments in 
international rules and institutions’. 
Such arguments centred not only on a set of established analytical 
perspectives dealing with European foreign policy, but also on ideas about 
regional and global governance that have a far broader resonance. There is 
an intimate connection between conceptions of the EU’s international role and 
the responsibilities that might logically follow from that. Thus Miliband in 
common with many others pointed to four specific principles that (he argued) 
would make roles and responsibilities operate fruitfully together: openness to 
trade, ideas and investment; the use of the power of ‘shared institutions and 
shared activities’ to help overcome religious, regional and cultural divides, 
especially with the Islamic world; the championing of international law and 
human rights on a global scale, backed up by the development of new ‘hard 
power’ capabilities where necessary; and the pursuit of ambitious targets in 
the area of environmental damage-limitation, based on the internal 
environmental regimes established within the Union. Surrounding debates 
about the revision of the 2003 European Security Strategy encouraged further 
reflection about the range of principles the EU wishes to pursue and the range 
of resources that might be available to pursue them in the future, with a 
particular emphasis on the pursuit of multilateralism and the deployment of 
‘soft power’ (Gnesotto and Grevi 2006; Grevi 2008). 
What is striking about the debates on the future of European foreign 
policy is their focus on the relationship between soft and hard power, and also 
their focus on relations with both the United States and the Islamic world as 
one acid test of the EU’s international impact and credibility. The debates also 
centred, directly or indirectly, on a number of key assumptions that will be 
scrutinised in what follows. First, many policy makers identified what might be 
termed a ‘triangle of forces’ constituted by the EU, the US and the Islamic 
world, in which a number of key tests are posed by the interaction of policies 
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and values. Second, they linked this to the development by the EU of a more 
substantial foreign and security policy that links together not only ‘soft’ or 
‘civilian’ power but also increasing elements of ‘hard’ power’, thus arguably 
making it into something approximating a ‘real’ foreign policy. Third, the 
debates indirectly responded to three key logics in the development of 
European foreign policy: what might be termed the ‘integration logic’, the 
‘external logic’ and the ‘identity logic’. Finally, the debates linked the 
legitimacy and credibility of European foreign policy to key tests arising from 
the interaction of the West with the Islamic world: Iraq and the Lebanon, 
Afghanistan, and enlargement to include Turkey, defined as a foreign policy 
issue for the EU (Barysch, Everts and Grabbe 2005, Youngs 2006). These 
are the themes that this article will pursue, since they raise vital analytical and 
practical questions about the ways in which the EU can establish and 
maintain a stable role in relations between the West and the Islamic world, 
and in particular between US policies and the challenges posed by the Islamic 
world. 
  
Three Logics of European Foreign Policy 
European foreign policy has developed during the past forty years (taking the 
Hague Summit of 1969 as a key initial step) in response to three logics. The 
first is the logic of the integration process, which creates pressures for 
institutional change and policy innovation as a means of stabilising and 
consolidating the internal forces released by ‘ever-closer union’. The second 
is the logic of the external opportunity structure, which creates opportunities 
and challenges for an integrating Europe in the world arena, and which 
thereby can demand change and innovation at the level of international 
action. The third logic is that of European identity, which creates pressures for 
‘self-recognition’ and the projection of a specifically European collective 
position on the world stage, often but not always in contradistinction to the 
positions of other leading actors. In reality, of course, these logics do not exist 
in separate compartments, and in many ways there is a ‘fourth logic’, a logic 
of linkages and reinforcements or contradictions between the three core 
logics. 
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 How do these logics show themselves in the development and the key 
characteristics of European foreign policy? The first logic, relating to the 
integration process, has several manifestations. One of these goes back to 
the very early characterisation of the integration process as one of ‘spillover’ 
(M. Smith 1998): to put it crudely, the development of internal integration 
creates a demand for integration of external actions, and thus leads to 
institutional change and policy innovation accompanied by ‘externalisation’ of 
integration needs. Alongside this process has gone another one: the process 
of institutional change itself, which has led to the embedding of European 
foreign policy into an increasingly dense set of institutional arrangements, and 
to the generation of accompanying networks and policy communities that 
demonstrate the effects of successive institutional bargains (M.E. Smith 
2003). At times, because of the ways in which these two processes – of 
spillover and of institutionalisation – have interacted, it has become clear that 
the development of European foreign policy can be important to the further 
consolidation of internal integration, providing a kind of feedback or safety-
valve that can counteract some of the problems encountered with internal 
initiatives (Gnesotto 2005; M.E. Smith 2003, 2004). Recognition of the 
interactions between the emerging European foreign policy and the internal 
integration process is thus of considerable importance for the understanding 
of both. 
 But there is another aspect of the internal integration logic that is 
significant: the ways in which the construction of a European foreign policy 
has to accommodate the continued existence and in many areas the 
dominance of the EU’s Member States. Despite the advances embodied in 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) since the beginning of the 1990s, there is still a 
very substantial inter-governmental component to European foreign policy, 
and it is difficult to see this as disappearing in the near future. What this 
means is that in addition to the linkage between the internal integration logic 
and the development of European foreign policy, we also need to recognise a 
kind of ‘disintegration logic’ or ‘variable geometry’ in areas where the needs of 
individual Member States take priority over those of European collective 
action. Adrian Hyde-Price has argued that this effectively reduces European 
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foreign policy to dealing with ‘second order’ issues that Member States are 
willing (at least temporarily) to concede to the European level (Hyde-Price 
2007, 2008). The reasons for this may be positive – the desire to contribute to 
collective action on problems shared by all Member States – or more 
negative, reflecting the desire to shift the blame for areas of controversy or 
difficulty away from the national level. But there is little doubt that this 
interaction between Member State preferences and European collective 
action will persist in European foreign policy. 
 The second logic on which I focus here is the ‘external’ logic reflecting 
the international opportunity structure that confronts the EU and European 
foreign policy. There is little doubt that this structure has changed markedly 
since the first limited commitments to European Political Cooperation in the 
late1960s. During the Cold War period, moves towards European foreign 
policy were in many ways ‘contained’ by the predominant logic of relations 
between the then Superpowers and by the maintenance of the Western 
Alliance. As this structure loosened during the 1980s, there was more space 
for the development of European foreign policy cooperation, and this was 
reflected in the Single European Act of 1986 – the first document to embed 
the notion of foreign policy cooperation as a key element of the European 
integration process. But the SEA still reflected the severe constraints imposed 
by the primacy of NATO and the logic of Cold War politics.  
The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s transformed 
many aspects of this situation. First, the predominance of the Superpower 
duopoly was challenged and then largely eliminated. Second, within Europe 
itself the demand for stabilisation based around the ‘zone of peace’ created by 
the European integration process was tangible and challenged the EC/EU in 
areas where they had a comparative advantage: the creation of a ‘community 
of law’ and the inculcation of legal, administrative and market structures that 
had deep effects on the countries to which they were applied. This is the basis 
of the argument that enlargement during the 1990s and early 2000s has been 
the most successful ‘European foreign policy’, giving the EU a major if not 
dominant role in the emerging European order (K. Smith 2003, 2005b; M. 
Smith 2007b). Accompanying this process has been that of globalisation, 
through which the connectedness of national societies has become ever 
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deeper and the transmission of international ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ has become 
ever swifter. The status of the EU as a continental model of economic and 
social organisation might be seen as giving a strong basis here for the 
development of European foreign policy, but in many ways the strengths that 
give the EU a major role in the European order do not export easily; they are 
less immediately appropriate to a fluid and often chaotic world, and this 
means that the attempt to project ‘Europe’ into the global arena brings with it 
new risks and potential costs (see below). 
The preceding raises a key question: what is demanded by the 
changed opportunity structure in the world arena, and can the EU supply it 
through European foreign policy? The most obvious manifestation of this 
question is in the relationship between ‘soft’ or ‘civilian’ power and ‘hard’ 
power – the former based on persuasion, negotiation and reward, the latter on 
coercion and threats of punishment (Nye 2004). The conventional wisdom, 
both among policy analysts and policy-makers in the EU, was for a long time 
that the European integration process led logically to the development and 
deployment of ‘soft power’, and in many cases there was an assumption that 
this was not only the practical but also the desirable position. Especially 
compared to the Superpowers (and then to the United States as the ‘only 
Superpower’) the EU held a position of comparative advantage, in which they 
could work in non-threatening ways to contribute to the world arena – to 
emphasise, in Arnold Wolfers’ terms, ‘milieu goals’ rather than ‘possession 
goals’ (Wolfers 1962). The logic also led towards an emphasis on multilateral 
cooperation and institutions, in which the European could also be seen as 
holding a comparative advantage because of their long history of intensive 
cross-national collaboration.  
But the logic of the post-Cold War, globalised world does not 
accommodate such a position so easily. The intensification of linkages 
between economics, diplomacy and security is well-established, and in fact 
preceded by some distance the end of the Cold War itself. At the same time, 
the speed of transmission of global ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ already mentioned 
creates a premium on rapid adaptation and innovation in foreign and security 
policy – a challenge that arguably the EU’s institutional and political set-up 
does not suit it to meet. Here, of course, we see a clear linkage between the 
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internal logic of the integration process and the external logic of international 
challenges and opportunities, since it is the strength and complexity of the 
internal process that might be seen as a disadvantage in responding 
creatively to external challenges or opportunities. The result has been a 
continuous search in the EU, since the end of the Cold War, for institutional 
fixes that can allow it to move collectively in response to global challenges 
and opportunities, but at the same time the persistence of contradictions that 
testify to the continuing power of the Member State perspective (Hill 2004). 
It is clear from the argument so far that both the ‘integration’ logic and 
the ‘external’ logic of European foreign policy are the source of contention and 
potential contradiction. Alongside them, we have to consider a third logic: the 
‘identity’ logic. Exploration of this logic has been at the centre of much 
analysis of European foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, and of the 
specific issues attaching to such areas as enlargement, development and 
human rights (Manners 2002, 2007; K. Smith 2003; Sedelmeier 2005, 2006). 
The search for a collective European identity, and the creation of collective 
European experience as a contribution towards that identity, has inevitably 
been fostered by the collapse of the Cold War structures and by the fracturing 
of seemingly solid identities that has gone along not only with the end of the 
Cold War but also with the march of globalisation. European foreign policy in 
this context has been driven not only by the needs of the integration process 
and by external challenges and opportunities, but also by a search for 
meaning and collective experience at the European level, and then by the 
projection of this meaning and experience into the global arena. What matters 
to this logic is the nature of social experience and social learning in the EU, 
among both policy-makers and other groups within European society, and the 
ways in which this changes understandings of the appropriate role(s) for the 
EU in international politics.  
At one level, this is an analytical logic, applied by those investigating 
the development of European foreign policy and attempting to explain why it 
has fostered and projected a specific set of norms and values – for example 
multilateralism, deliberation, human rights, comprehensive security, 
cosmopolitanism. At another level, the realisation of the identity logic reflects 
the search by policy-makers themselves for a narrative that can articulate 
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something specifically ‘European’ and which reflects the construction of 
‘policy-maker theories’ about the world and Europe’s role(s) within it. The 
impact of a search for appropriate European identities and roles through the 
medium of European foreign policy thus remains a key dimension of the 
overall development and consolidation of that policy. Not only this, but norms 
and values have become part of the stock in trade of EU policy-makers, and 
part of the ways in which they frame their approaches to specific regions or 
issues in the global arena (Bicchi 2007; Panebianco 2006; Smith and 
Vichitsorasatra 2007). Arguments have been made to the effect that the 
impact of these norms and values takes the EU beyond the status of 
‘normative power’ and enables it to act as a ‘civilising power’ by creating or 
contributing to structures of global or regional governance or by pursuing 
conditionality in key areas of policy implementation (Linklater 2005; K. Smith 
2003; Laatikainen and Smith 2006). Here, though, there is a need to be 
careful: first, the impact of the EU’s ‘civilising’ actions may not be experienced 
or understood as civilising by their targets, and second, there is evidence of 
frequent and perhaps increasing inconsistency between the EU’s words and 
its deeds in such areas as trade policy, to the extent that it casts doubt on the 
‘normative’ character of the policies themselves (Jørgensen 2006). Finally, it 
is important here as elsewhere to note that the ‘European’ level of 
identification with norms, values and policies has to compete within Europe 
itself with long-established or resurgent national forces that will not soon 
disappear. 
What does this examination of the three logics tell us about the 
changing nature of European foreign policy? First, it is clear that the three 
logics are not self-contained, insulated one from the others. They interact, and 
in the interaction can be found important pointers towards the past, current 
and future development of European foreign policy. Second, their interaction 
has become more intensive during the past fifteen years, when the end of the 
Cold War, the emergence of a new world (dis)order, institutional change and 
policy innovation in the EU and the increasing consciousness of European 
collective distinctiveness on the world stage have come together to create 
new momentum towards a European foreign policy. Third, that momentum 
has not been continuous or always cumulative; the process has been lumpy 
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and spasmodic, since all three of the logics have not always pointed in the 
direction of increased European foreign policy development.  
 The interaction of the three logics is given added point by the impact of 
September 11th 2001 (Hill 2004, M. Smith 2006). Although it did not begin in 
2001, during the period since ‘9.11’ there has been a persistent push towards 
greater institutionalisation of security and defence policy in the EU, and the 
‘securitisation’ of additional areas of European integration more generally, 
reflecting the operation of the ‘integration logic’. This has been reinforced at 
important points by the ‘external logic’ of demands from the world arena, on 
the one hand from the United States through the ‘war on terror’, and on the 
other hand through the development of opportunities in Africa and elsewhere 
for the deployment of EU-badged forces. There has also been a continuing 
role for the ‘identity logic’, in respect of alignment with or separation from US 
policies, and in relation to the increased pressures for a ‘hardening’ of EU 
power through the development of military capacities, but this logic has not 
been without its areas of contention or conflict. The result is a set of trends 
and tensions that has arguably become more severe as the post-9.11 period 
has evolved, and which promises to become more severe still. 
My argument is that this set of growing tensions, contradictions and 
concerns is focused and concentrated by the ways in which the EU has been 
confronted with the demands emanating from the ‘triangle of forces’ existing 
between the EU, the United States and the Islamic world. In the next section 
of the paper, I explore this ‘triangle of forces’ and attempt to clarify its 
implications for the current and future development of European foreign 
policy, with reference to the three logics and the range of forces identified in 
this section. 
 
Responding to the Islamic World and the United States: The EU and the 
‘Triangle of Forces’ 
In this part of the article, I move from discussion of the development of 
European foreign policy to discussion of the ways in which it locates itself 
between the complex and challenging forces of the Islamic world and the 
United States. Before developing the argument it is important to establish an 
understanding of what some of the key terms used here are taken to mean. 
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The first of these is ‘the Islamic world’. This might be understood as ‘the 
Muslim world’ (implying the world of Muslim countries), or alternatively as ‘the 
world of Islamist ideologies’ (which may or may not be associated with 
particular Muslim countries), or alternatively as ‘the world of Muslim people’ 
(whether or not they are associated with a particular Muslim country or 
associate themselves with Islamist ideologies). For the European Union, in 
fact, all three of these manifestations coexist in the making of European 
foreign policy: they intersect with the logics of European foreign policy by 
forming part of the politics of integration within Europe (through the presence 
of Muslim populations within the EU), by forming part of the external structure 
of opportunities or constraints (especially through the EU’s relations with 
Muslin countries, but also through the activities of transnational Muslim 
groupings), and by constituting a challenge – or an alternative - to notions of a 
European identity in the changing world arena (see for example Asad 2002, 
Hunter 2002: Part III, Shadid and van Koningsveld 2002, Savage 2004, Zemni 
2002). 
 A second key term that demands definition is ‘United States’. For the 
entire life of the European integration project, the USA has been Europe’s 
most significant ‘other’. Its impact on European foreign policy, though, has 
been ambiguous throughout. American attitudes towards European 
integration have been ambivalent: at the broadest level, support for the project 
as a stabilising and energising force, but at the level of policy detail a 
continuing preoccupation with the challenge posed by ‘Europe’ as an 
economic and (increasingly) a diplomatic power. At the same time, American 
actions in the world arena have formed a fluctuating backdrop for the 
development of European foreign policy, and have been seen since at least 
the late 1960s as a source of risk and possible danger (McGuire and Smith 
2008: chapters 1 and 9; Peterson and Pollack 2003). Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the pursuit of European identity in the world arena has developed 
partly as a means of focusing difference between the EC/EU and the United 
States, and has been sharpened and often crystallised by US actions in such 
theatres as Southeast Asia, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. Just as with 
the Islamic world, therefore, the United States intersects with and complicates 
the three logics of European foreign policy. 
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 The argument here is that the intersection of the Islamic world (defined 
broadly as above) and the United States (in its fluctuating manifestations) with 
European foreign policy creates a ‘triangle of forces’ to which the Europeans 
have had to respond. It is tempting to consider this ‘triangle of forces’ between 
the EU, the US and the Islamic world in rather traditional terms (for example, 
Savage 2004). On the one side, there is the power and potential hegemony of 
the world’s only Superpower, which at least during the past few years has 
been expressed in notably unilateral and confrontational terms. On the other 
side, there is the challenge of dealing with a wide range of countries from 
Morocco to Indonesia that have major Muslim populations and that are in 
many cases strategically important both to the EU and to the United States. 
Such an analysis has the strength that it promises to identify the key strategic 
challenges and opportunities for the EU, and to show how the EU, with its 
partial but growing European foreign policy, might respond to them. And of 
course, such an analysis is often conducted by those who emphasise the role 
of European foreign policy as a form of balancing (either ‘soft’ or now ‘harder’) 
between contending external forces, or those who see the key aims of the EU 
as ensuring a stable and orderly international arena in which it can pursue its 
objectives as a ‘trading state’ (M. Smith 2004; Pape 2005). In this way, the 
EU’s situation between the United States and the Islamic world privileges 
what we earlier described as the ‘external logic’ of European foreign policy: 
the challenges and opportunities are out there and the task is to steer 
between them using the instruments of European foreign policy. 
 The reality, however, is not so simple, and it challenges the 
presumption that there might be a unified or uniform ‘European’ approach to 
foreign policy in this area. What appears to be a triangle of (separate) forces 
is in reality a deeply interpenetrated set of relationships, in which the EU finds 
itself a central focus and which (as outlined above) intersects with the three 
central logics of European foreign policy. The United States is not just ‘out 
there’ for the EU: it is inside the EU culturally, economically, politically and in 
terms of the strategic practices and priorities to which most European defence 
establishments still subscribe. In a similar way, the Islamic world is not just 
‘out there’: it exists within the EU in terms of domestic Islamic populations, 
and in terms of cultures that have been shaped by the results of many 
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centuries of interaction. As noted above, neither the American nor the Islamic 
presence is uniform and unvarying, but neither can be ignored as a factor in 
the internal European integration process. In this way, the ‘triangle of forces’ 
intersects with the ‘integration logic’ in the EU and in European foreign policy 
to shape the ways in which European foreign policy-makers approach their 
external tasks.  
 The ‘triangle of forces’ also intersects with the ‘identity logic’ of 
European foreign policy, since it presents the Europeans with competing 
‘others’ and with the need to define ‘Europeanness’ in some ways as distinct 
from both the United States and the Islamic world. This is not an easy task, 
given the admitted difficulties of defining a European identity for a Union of 27 
Member States, and it is of course complicated further by the unevenness of 
experience and contact between the Member States and both of these 
outside forces. It has often been noted that a number of EU Member States 
have ‘special relationships’ with the USA, but it is equally significant that many 
of them also have ‘special relationships’ with the Islamic world, whether this is 
through the presence of Muslims in domestic populations, through the 
historical impact of colonialism and its legacy, or through the impact of Islamic 
ideas within European cultures (Kumar 2002). As noted earlier in the paper, 
the internal balances of preferences and normative positions among EU 
Member States are a constantly shifting element in the definition of European 
foreign policy and of European roles in the global arena, and the conflicting 
demands posed by a domineering and challenging USA and a highly varied 
but equally challenging Islamic world make the development of a ‘European’ 
consensus all the more difficult. 
 So, to put it simply, the EU is stuck in a position where the three logics 
driving the development of European foreign policy are intersected by the 
often contradictory logics of relations with the USA and the Islamic world. At 
the same time, I would also argue that the ‘triangle of forces’ is a key 
complicating element (but also a key catalyst) in the more specific trends and 
tensions identified in the second part of this paper. The deteriorating but 
intense relations between the USA and some Islamic countries, and its 
overspill into broader ‘Western’ conceptions of Islam, have set the EU and its 
developing foreign policy a set of almost impossible tasks, given what we 
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know about the forces shaping that foreign policy in more general terms. In 
the first place, the ‘triangle of forces’ has played a key role in intensifying the 
‘securitisation’ of European foreign policy, and in driving the shift towards 
‘security policy’ rather than diplomacy or defence policy. This in turn has 
pushed the EU further onto very difficult terrain, where the risks not only in 
terms of foreign policy but also in terms of ‘societal security’ are difficult to 
estimate or to confront.  
Paradoxically, it could be argued that the EU’s move via the ESDP into 
a ‘harder’ defence policy posture has not really reflected the ‘triangle of forces’ 
up to now; rather, the focus has been on tasks such as conflict prevention and 
peacekeeping in areas where relations between the US and the Islamic world 
are less prominent, or on civilian reconstruction where they are an issue 
(Howorth 2007: chapter 7). The EU has not taken on a military or security role 
directly in Iraq or Afghanistan, for example. The exceptions that may or may 
not prove the rule relate to the Palestinian territories, where the EU has 
provided border monitoring and policing support through civilian missions 
since 2005, and the Lebanon, where the EU (or rather a group of EU Member 
States) has emerged as a sub-contractor (informally if not formally) for the UN 
in an area where the US feels it cannot be directly engaged on the ground 
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: chapter 7). The EU’s role in both of 
these cases is a matter of very delicate negotiation and balancing both within 
and outside the European policy process, and it remains to be seen whether a 
marked deterioration in conditions within Palestine or within Lebanon itself 
would meet with a robust EU response. 
The expansion of the EU’s ‘defence perimeter’ through enlargement 
and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) clearly brings it into much 
closer contact with the ‘triangle of forces’ in geo-political terms. This has 
arguably been the case for some time given the intersection of US policies 
with Islamic populations in the former Yugoslavia, but it has become more 
marked in recent years with the development of the ENP and the prospect of 
enlargement to include Turkey. A key point to be made here is precisely that 
for the EU, the ‘triangle of forces’ has a much more tangible geopolitical 
meaning than it does for the United States or for Islamic countries: the EU is 
literally at the intersection, the ENP extends to include many Islamic countries 
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from the Maghreb to central Asia, and if Turkey joins there will be an EU 
border with Syria, Iraq and Iran. From the point of view of the internal EU 
integration process, such developments intensify existing differences of 
priority and perspective that have direct implications for the future 
development of the Union. In terms of European foreign policy, they mean a 
highly complex geopolitical as well as geo-cultural balancing act, which is 
complicated further by the internal differences we have noted. 
It is to be expected, therefore, that the tensions and contradictions 
outlined in the previous section will be exacerbated to the extent that they are 
intersected by the ‘triangle of forces’. The coexisting trends towards 
‘widening’, ‘deepening’ and ‘hardening’ in European foreign and security 
policy (through enlargement, institutional change and the development of the 
ESDP) have in many ways been at the heart of the discussion in this section 
so far. They have simultaneously put the EU in a position where it cannot 
ignore the challenges posed by the ‘triangle of forces’ and rendered more 
complex the balancing act that has to be performed between its elements. As 
a result, the often conflicting pressures towards ‘renationalisation’ through an 
increased role for Member States, ‘regrouping’ through the development of 
‘coalitions of the willing’ and ‘Europeanisation’ through the intensification of 
ESDP and CFSP alike can be expected to grow (Hill 2004, Smith 2006). The 
evidence from Iraq 2003, to a degree from Afghanistan since 2001, and from 
Lebanon 2006 is that these forces form a constant challenge to the framing 
and implementation of EU actions, and that the ‘triangle of forces’ poses 
questions that are very difficult to answer in the current state of European 
foreign policy. In the same way, the related tensions between multilateralism 
and minilateralism in European foreign policy can be and have been 
exacerbated by the ‘triangle of forces’ as expressed in recent conflicts: the 
Iraq crisis of 2003 saw constant manoeuvring on this front, the unevenness of 
European burden-sharing in Iraq may not specifically be an EU problem but it 
feeds back into perceptions of commitment to EU collective action elsewhere, 
and the Lebanon crisis saw similar tensions. EU policy towards Iran, focused 
on pursuit of a diplomatic solution and led by the ‘EU-3’, has perhaps been 
more of a European foreign policy success story, but it is difficult to estimate 
what the effects might be of a severe escalation of tensions (Posch 2006). 
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Does this mean that the veneer of collective commitment to European 
foreign policy is especially likely to shatter if subjected to challenge from the 
‘triangle of forces’ between the EU, the US and Islam? The implication of the 
preceding argument is that both the United States and Islam have distinctive 
capacities to create tensions within European foreign policy, and that their 
mutual relations can put the EU and its Member States in very difficult 
positions. Solidarity in these conditions is not easy to achieve, and defection 
from apparently agreed positions is all too easy to contemplate. This need not 
mean that European foreign policy as a whole is undermined, as evidenced 
by the operations carried out in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere during the 
past decade. The problem is that the extension and intensification of the 
tensions between the US and the Islamic world might reduce the amount of 
‘space’ in the world arena for the EU, and might politicise in a new way some 
of those areas where the EU has been able to undertake significant foreign 
policy initiatives in the past, thus exacerbating the differences of perspective 
within the EU itself and throwing into question the legitimacy of European 
foreign policy. 
In this context, the whole question of a European ‘civilising project’ is of 
central importance (Linklater 2005). If that is construed as a mediating project 
in a broader ‘clash of civilisations’, then the outlook might be bleak given the 
lack of room for manoeuvre available to the Union between the contending 
forces of the US and the Islamic world. On the other hand, if the ‘civilising 
project’ is seen as a way of understanding and responding to difference within 
the West and the Islamic world, then there is far more of a prospect that 
European foreign policy might have a truly civilising effect, by exploiting the 
space for diplomacy and for forms of balancing within and between the 
‘triangle of forces’. A note of caution must of course be entered here: the 
divisions referred to run through the EU as well as between the US and the 
Islamic world, so any effective use of European foreign policy mechanisms 
would need to confront that set of cleavages before setting about an external 
‘civilising mission’. 
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Conclusion: European Foreign Policy Between the United States and the 
Islamic World: Catalysed or Constrained? 
Two possible trajectories for European foreign policy can be derived from the 
argument in this article. The first sees European foreign policy as potentially 
or actually catalysed by the coming together of developments in the policy 
process and in European capabilities, and capable of taking the appropriate 
initiatives to extend the scope and impact of the European Union within the 
‘triangle of forces’. In this trajectory, the EU becomes more capable of 
resolving internal differences, of discerning external opportunities and of 
developing a shared view of the kind of international order it wants to pursue. 
This in turn would enable the EU to move beyond its role as an ‘intersection’ 
in the ‘triangle of forces’ and to advance credible alternative positions, if 
necessary backed up by ‘hard power’. As noted above, this is a relatively 
high-risk trajectory, since it entails the forsaking of a ‘civilian power’ role and 
the development of a far more muscular approach both to the United States 
and to Islamic countries or movements. 
 The second possible trajectory for European foreign policy can be 
described as ‘constrained’. In this trajectory, the diversity of internal 
preferences prevents the EU from adopting a clear position based on 
integration logic; as a result, external opportunities or challenges are not 
exploited or confronted in a direct way; and there is a conscious attempt either 
to play down the possibility of a common European understanding of the EU’s 
role(s) or to settle for a common conception of a minimalist role designed to 
preserve the EU’s trading priorities and to avoid confrontations either with the 
United States or with the Islamic world. This might be described as a low-risk 
trajectory, since its key element is the avoidance of confrontation and the 
preservation of core EU values at the expense of international activism. 
 The reality is that the EU is not really in a position to choose one or the 
other of these trajectories. As argued in this article, it has already been 
pushed onto terrain where the risks are higher, the potential costs higher and 
the stakes both for the EU and its Member States higher. The interaction of 
the three foreign policy logics outlined in this paper has created a kind of 
ratchet effect, where there is no going back to the safer terrain of ‘soft’ or 
‘civilian power’. When to the interaction of the three logics is added the 
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operation of the ‘triangle of forces’, the EU and its Member States find 
themselves with little room for manoeuvre, because of the ways in which 
these linked forces converge on the principles and practice of European 
foreign policy. There may well be arguments within the EU, both at the level of 
the policy community and at a broader popular level in the context of treaty 
ratification, about the choices that the EU ought to make. But in many ways 
these are arguments at the margin, about how to respond to the situation in 
which the EU now finds itself. As argued in this paper, this situation can best 
be characterised as ‘between “soft power” and a hard place’. 
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